Miriam A. Golden

Professor of Political Science
University of California at Los Angeles
Los Angeles, CA 90095
Office: 3262 Bunche Hall
tel: (310) 206-8166 (direct)
tel: (310) 825-4331 (department)
fax: (310) 825-0778

For the 2011-12 academic year:

Visiting Senior Research Scholar
307 Robertson Hall
Center for the Study of Democratic Politics
Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs
Princeton University
Princeton, NJ 08544
Tel: (609) 258-0501
Fax: (609) 258-5014

E-Mail




Miriam Golden teaches comparative politics in the Department of Political Science at UCLA. At the undergraduate level she teaches PS167D, “Political Institutions and Economic Development” and at the graduate level she teaches seminars on distributive politics and on inequality as well as participating in the instruction of the core seminar in the field of comparative politics. She recently served as Chair of the American Political Science Association’s Organized Section in Political Economy and she serves on the editorial boards of various U.S. and European professional journals. Her research has been funded by the National Science Foundation, the International Growth Centre, and the Governments of Quebec and Canada. For the 2011-12 academic year, she is on leave as a Visiting Scholar at the Center for the Study of Democratic Politics at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University.

Professor Golden is currently involved in a major research project on the partisan and electoral bases of political corruption in rich and poor democracies. Drawing on a decade of research into political corruption and pork barrel politics in Italy in the second half of the twentieth century, Golden has begun investigating similar phenomena in contemporary India. The main question animating the project is how corruption can flourish under competitive electoral conditions, when voters have regular opportunities to eject from public office officials who betray the public trust. Golden anticipates that this project will result in a book on corruption in democratic countries.

Other projects which Professor Golden is working on include:

“Local Level Estimates of Corruption and Theft in the Energy Sector in Uttar Pradesh, India,” joint with Brian Min, University of Michigan. Related to her comparative project on corruption in democratic countries, this project uses data from the public energy corporation of India's most populous state, Uttar Pradesh, to generate local level estimates of the extent to which energy loss is due to corruption and theft. Preliminary results show that relatively well-off farmers are the main group to enjoy substantial amounts of electricity without payment. In addition, this systematic abuse of government allocation of a scare resource increases in election years.

“Climate Change and Public Health among Canadian Inuit,” joint with Brian Min, University of Michigan. This study uses satellite data of changes in the ice melt along the east coast of Quebec and Nunavut to document a link between the growing unpredictability in the weather and incidents of antisocial and self-destructive behavior of inhabitants in Inuit villages.

“Uncontested Local Elections and Political Capture in Quebec and Nunavik,” joint with UCLA Ph.D. student Yuki Yanai. In the 1,100 municipalities of the province of Quebec, more than 60 percent of mayors enter office having faced no electoral competition. This project examines the conditions under which unopposed elections occur. Preliminary analysis shows that political competition is less likely to occur in small towns with high rates of poverty and monolingual Francophone populations. The study also analyzes data on local elections over a ten year period in the 14 Inuit villages of the northern part of the province. Almost all mayoral elections in these villages have been contested, despite the Inuit’s lack of experience with electoral democracy.

“Incumbency of Italian Legislators, 1948 to 1994,” joint with Lucio Picci, University of Bologna. This project analyzes the electoral returns to pork and patronage for members of the Italian national legislature over a forty-five year period. Although most legislators in Italy's lower house experienced an incumbency disadvantage in postwar Italy, a small elite successfully targeted government resources to their districts to gain a significant incumbency advantage.





Website last updated: September 20, 2011